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Introduction 
The comparison between price and quantity 
competition has been extensively discussed in the lit-
erature. In oligopolies, it is well known that price 
competition is tougher, resulting in a lower level of 
profits between private firms, compared with quantity 
competition [1–4]. Bertrand competition is one of the 
most important models in oligopoly field, which has 
been intensively studied in various contexts. 
Nash Equilibrium is the optimal state where each 
player maximizes his profit, considering other players’ 
strategies. Meanwhile, there are still some studies on 
the Nash Equilibrium under different conditions in 
Bertrand duopoly game [5–8]. Plenty of cases have 
been checked and simulated on searching the equilib-
rium. 
However, we can deduce the equilibrium of the 
Bertrand model based on the game theory, but to find 
it that for companies whose production costs are iden-
tical, Bertrand competition leads to zero profit, with 
the prices set equal to the marginal cost at the equilib-
rium [9, 10]. Comparing with real market, no compa-
nies would do it without profits.  
Meta-heuristic algorithms and especially evolu-
tionary algorithms are used to find the equilibrium of 
electricity markets [9]. Numerous methods have been 
proposed to analyze Bertrand model, many experts 
study related problems via Markov Method mathemat-
ically [11, 12], moreover, quite a few people start re-
searches by agent, which provide us with some en-
lightening approaches [13]. Simulations on the strate-
gic interactions between market agents by applying a 
mean of a co-evolutionary algorithm are established 
[14–17]. Furthermore, agent-based modelling, market 
participants are modelled to maximize their profits 
autonomously by learning from the interactions in the 
markets. 
It is known to us that some very fierce competi-
tive fields, as in China, the retail markets, finance 
payment and the electricity market etc. are or are be-
coming the duopoly. It is of great use to analyze this 
kind of market by using agent-based model and do 
some market simulations, which will provide more 
accurate and beneficial guidance on the market strate-
gies. In this way, the players can make out better and 
appropriate solutions when the similar circumstances 
happen. 
We proposed some related analysis on how Ber-
trand model display itself in duopoly game [18–20], 
using Genetic Algorithm (GA), with the help of 
Matlab. Then comparisons and analysis on different 
cases of quantities and prices are also discussed. 
Therefore, based on classic Bertrand model, dif-
ferent market models are established. Further, the 
simulations for these models   
Classic Bertrand Model 
French economist Joseph Bertrand proposed the 
Bertrand model in 1883 [16]. Unlike the Cournot 
Экономическая теория и мировая экономика  
 
DOI: 10.14529/em180201 
ANALYSIS ON THE AGENT-BASED  
BERTRAND DUOPOLY GAME MODEL 
Huang Xian, Hong Jia 
North China Electric Power University, Beijing, P.R.C. 
 
 
The duopoly market research has a long history. Due to such reasons as material supply, product pa-
tent right and concession of the government, development of many economic industries is similar to the 
process of duopoly. In game theory, the Bertrand model which considers price to be a strategic variable is 
closer to reality and provides the market with more references, especially for retail market and electricity 
market, as the competitive world develops.  
Firstly, we analyze the classical Bertrand model and the Nash equilibrium in the model. 
Secondly, multi-agent technology is applied and the Bertrand duopoly game bidding process is con-
ducted; meanwhile, in order to help agents find the optimal solutions, genetic algorithm based on multi-
agent Bertrand model is chosen as the main algorithm for the research; and we finish with software im-
plementation of the algorithm and with example analysis. In the end, oligopoly market bidding is also 
modelled in MATLAB simulation, which provides us with more accuracies and flexibilities. 
It is evidently shown in the model that when none of the two companies are able to meet all the de-
mands in the market, the bigger the price gap, the more oscillated it is in the process; thus, the pure stra-
tegic Nash equilibrium doesn’t exist. However, when one of the two can offer the demands independent-
ly, Nash equilibrium appears and is shown as the calculated results in Bertrand-Edgeworth model where 
the equilibrium reaches the cost price. Further, the reason for no pure strategic Nash Equilibrium is also 
discussed. 
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model and Stackelberg model where the first two 
models are based on the production as the decision 
variables in the competitions, which is, however, Ber-
trand model is based where the price functions as the 
decision variable, which belongs to the price competi-
tion model. 
As the classical Bertrand model depicts, we have, 
Bertrand model hypothesis: 
(1) the oligarchs are competing with the price. 
(2) the products produced by the oligarchs are of 
equal quality and can be replaced completely. 
(3) there is no formal or informal collusion be-
tween the oligarchs. 
(4) the total market demand is constant, which is 
a rigid demand. 
(5) the company with a lower price is first to ob-
tain the market share, while the same competitive 
price share the common market. 
In building the model, we can also find that when 
the other assumptions of the model are the same, the 
products will be changed as the products produced by 
the oligarch enterprises can be replaced. The price of 
the commodity will limit the sales, which can be ob-
tained: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
where: 𝑄 is the total market demand; Pi is the price of 
company i; Pm is the highest price that meets the total 
market demand(the critical price); while the symbol j 
is the index of a company whose price is less than 
critical price; iq is the production of company i and 
'iq  is the sales of company i . 
When Pi is less than Pm, the sales is equal to the 
production. When Pi is equal to Pm, the sales amount 
is equal to the average value where rest of companies 
separate the rest productions evenly. When Pi is great-
er than Pm, the sales output is 0. 
Market Modeling of Bertrand Model 
In the Bertrand model, the profit function of 
companies can be expressed as follows: 
 ( )i i i cif q p p      (2) 
where: 𝑓𝑖 is profit function of company 𝑖; 𝑝𝑖  is the 
price of company 𝑖; 𝑞𝑖 is the production of company 𝑖; 
𝑝𝑐𝑖  is the cost price of company 𝑖. 
Based on Bertrand model and multi-agent, we 
can draw the profit figure 1, where we can obtained 
that, the market profits of a company will be affected 
by the following factors: 
(1) price of a company 𝑝𝑖and its production𝑞𝑖. 
(2) the correlation coefficient of the market de-
mand function for the product, the cost of the compa-
ny i and the demand for the market 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
(3) in the game market, the price and output of 
other companies are also important factors. Thus, each 
of the companies' profits in the market will be affected 
by more than three factors. It is clear that the produc-
tion and price of its own are the decision variables of 
the company itself. The maximum profit is achieved 
by changing its own production and price. Moreover, 
when the market is determined, the correlation coeffi-
cient in the demand function becomes a fixed value. 
The impacts that each company imposed on the profit 
function makes each of them correlate, influence, and 
change. 
According to the multi-agent simulation technol-
ogy, the associated profits of Bertrand model was 
shown in fig 1, it is obvious that company i can make 
comparison and relative study according to the game 
result of other companies of price and production in 
the last round and consider that this value will remain 
unchanged in the current round. Therefore, with the 
knowledge of this information, the company j will 
compare the price difference and find the critical 
price. 
In a multi-agent system based on Bertrand model 
can be further improved: 
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The new profit function is:     
, , , ,' ( ) (0 ).
m
i n i n i n ci i n if q p p p p      (4) 
In the formula (4), 𝑃𝑖,𝑚 is the price ceiling com-
pany i, 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the market demand; 𝑝𝑚,𝑛 is the critical 
price in round n; 𝑞𝑖,𝑛 is the sale of company i in round 
n; 𝑓𝑖,𝑛is the profit function of company i in round n; 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡
′  is the production of company i in round n. 
According to the above-mentioned analysis, in 
order to find out how the model works, combining 
with genetic algorithm (GA),we take duopoly for fur-
ther study. 
Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand Duopoly Model 
According to the classical Bertrand model of du-
opoly competition, we established the market model 
as follows: 
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It is assumed that there are two oligarchs who 
produce the same product: company 1 and company 2, 
and the price of their products are  𝑝1, 𝑝2 respectively. 
As a result, the sales of company 1 are as follows: 
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The profit function of company 1 can be ex-
pressed as follows: 
   1 1 1( )cif q p p   .   (6) 
In the same way, the profit function of company 
2 is: 
2 2 2( ).cif q p p      (7) 
Companies in the Bertrand model bid simultane-
ously, it is calculated that the Nash equilibrium exists 
and unique in it as (𝑝1
∗, 𝑝2
∗). However, the two compa-
nies have their own products priced at cost price, 
namely, 𝑝1
∗ = 𝑝2
∗ = c, where there is an indeed Nash 
equilibrium  On the basis of this price, the profits of 
both sides are zero. At the same time, both companies 
realizes that no one could benefit from raising prices. 
It is because that once a company rises the price, the 
company will lose the market shares, then the profits 
of the company will reduced to zero (if not, the profit 
is also zero because the equilibrium price equals to 
cost price, even the two companies share the market, 
no profits can be made). 
There is no doubt that one of the two companies 
can completely reduce the price to the cost price c, 
and this move will directly lead to the loss of the 
company. 
As the two manufacturers are able to meet the 
market demand alone, there is no absolute price ad-
vantage and turn into a "competing for a lower price" 
process to seize market share and gain the maximum 
profit. Finally, the equilibrium is achieved, but the 
equilibrium price is the production price. 
Simulation case 
Hypothesis 1: suppose that there are only two 
companies produce the same product that can be sub-
stituted for each other. At the same time, the maxi-
mum production capacity of any companies cannot 
meet the market's total demand alone. 
The two companies can be Company 1 and Com-
pany 2 respectively. Then we set the parameters for 
Bertrand–Edgeworth model in the market game: 
1 2 05000, 12, 0 , 4000, 5.maxQ p q q p      
(8)
 
In order to gain their own maximum profits, the 
two companies will play a number of price games. In 
the first round game, the decision variables can only 
be randomly selected within the constraints, for the 
agents are not fully aware of the market environment. 
At the beginning of the second round game, there was 
a price combination in the first round of the game, and 
the two companies suppose that the other party would 
keep the first round price in the next round, which was 
used as a known market information to make price 
decisions respectively. The competitive price game in 
the third round is known as the result of the second 
round of bidding. By analogy, a multi-round game is 
carried out.  
According to the characteristics of the model, the 
price strategy of Company A and Company B would 
reduce the price as much as possible to maximize their 
profits, so that they can sell the most products and 
maximize profits. When price is down to a critical 
value, a company will directly raise the price, and the 
other company will keep up with its own price. In 
order to fight for market share, the two sides will push 
down the price after the rising price. Then the game 
will go round and begin again. 
This will show the periodicity. According to the 
characteristics of the cycle, the first part of the oscilla-
tion range is large which is recognized as the large 
oscillation area. The second part of the shock is rela-
tively small, which is called a small oscillation area. 
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Fig. 1. Associated Profit Function of Bertrand Model 
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Hypothesis two: suppose that there are only two 
companies produce the same product that can be sub-
stituted for each other. The maximum production ca-
pacity of a company can meet the total demand of the 
market, and competition will lead to price reduction to 
the cost price of the product. The competition is the 
most intense at this time. 
The first and second companies play a multi-
round game in the market according to the Bertrand 
Edgeworth model. The parameters are as follows: 
1 2 04000, 12, 0 , 4000, 5.maxQ p q q p      (9) 
Discussions and Simulation Results 
Simulation analysis for hypothetical one: 
According to the hypothesis of the model, when 
the total demand 𝑄 of the market is determined, then, 
the two companies' maximum production capacity 𝑞1 
and 𝑞2are also set, so the profit functions of each 
company can be simplified as the followings: 
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It is assumed that the cost of Company 1 and 
Company 2 is 5. The simulation results are discussed 
in detail. 
We can see that when the output of the two com-
panies can't meet the market demand alone, the two 
companies will game for many rounds, showing big or 
small oscillations. As the competition goes its way, no 
Nash equilibrium is found. With the help of genetic 
algorithm optimization analysis, we found the law in 
market oscillation, in the case of limited rationality.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Sharp Oscillation Zone of Bertrand Model 
 
Fig. 3. Small Oscillation Zone of Bertrand Model 
 
Хуан Сиань, Хун Цзя             Анализ игровой модели на основе  
         дуополии Бертрана 
Вестник ЮУрГУ. Серия «Экономика и менеджмент». 
2018. Т. 12, № 2. С. 7–14  11 
Since its own output cannot meet the demand of the 
market, there are two ways to obtain the market profit: 
to increase market price to obtain less market share or 
to reduce market price to obtain a larger market share 
to gain a good profit. The two companies will con-
stantly weigh the two ways in the market game. As a 
result, the price of a company decreases as the price of 
another one decreases to game for a higher market 
share. However, since the total output of the two man-
ufacturers cannot meet the demand of the market 
alone, when the market price falls to a certain level, 
even if one of the company sells all the output, there 
will still be a surplus of market demand. Companies 
with limited rationality will reduce the market share 
by raising the price to gain the market profits. In this 
way, there will be a process of rising up and going 
down shown in the simulations. The magnitude and 
frequency of the shock are related to the critical price 
(The selling price of the same profit when one compa-
ny holds the dominant price while the output is the 
dominant factor of another company.) 
When bidding process is in sharp oscillation 
zone, Company 1 and Company 2 take the relatively 
higher or lower price in turns. And due to the charac-
teristics of the model, company with low price will 
gain more market share (which is the 𝑞1 or 𝑞2), com-
pany with higher price will get less market share (i.e. 
the total demand of Q minus the production of lower-
price company). 
When the two companies continue their bidding 
game in small oscillation zone, both will adjust their 
product prices to get bigger market share. From the 
figure, we can see that the price is decreasing in bid-
ding process. 
When the price of both sides game for the price, 
the profit will change. Because of the violent jitter of 
the price, the cycle will change constantly, meanwhile, 
it is evident that the profits of the two companies will 
also undergo drastic and cyclical changes. When they 
are competing for lower prices, profits are declining, 
while the price is at lower condition (we chose 6.8), 
suddenly there will be one choose to raise the price for 
profits, the other party immediately follow the price to 
increase profits, then once again lowered the price of 
competing market game. As a result of the repeated 
game, the profit has a periodic change. Figure 4 ex-
plains this. 
The reason for the volatility in the bidding pro-
cess is that: 
Both of them are pursuing different bidding strat-
egies in order to pursue maximum benefits, so that 
they can take advantage of production and win the 
most profits in the process of game. In this way, both 
sides will take a slightly lower price strategy, hoping 
to be lower than the other's offer by which way to ob-
tain more benefits. However, in the process of bid-
ding, there will be a distinction between the prices. 
The two sides' bottom line will not reach the cost 
price, for the maximum production capacity of each 
company is not enough to meet the total demand of 
the market independently. 
On the one hand, both sides are constantly lower-
ing their prices to get the largest market share. On the 
other hand, they hope to raise their prices in the next 
round and make profits even higher. The two compa-
nies put down their own prices alternately, and they 
rebounded to a high price at a certain price. And then 
in order to grab more market shares, they lower their 
prices again. The bidding process of each round is 
similar, so there will be an oscillation. 
The difference in the amplitude of the oscillation 
is that in each bidding process, the rise and decline of 
the price are related to the price of the two parties at 
the beginning of the game. When the difference be-
tween the quotations is relatively large, there is a big 
oscillation area. 
 
Fig. 4. Profit Changes of Company 1 and Company 2 
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Unit price of the two players is decreasing slowly 
during the slight fluctuation. When companies reach 
the lowest acceptable price, the lower price company 
will abandon the low price but to rise the price to get a 
bigger profit, so the price will rise. 
Therefore, the conclusion can be obtained ac-
cording to the Bertrand Edgeworth model, when pro-
duction capacity is limited, it is difficult to predict the 
duopoly market price, there is no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. 
For the analysis of the simulation results of hy-
pothesis two: as the price of either side of the two 
sides can meet the market demand, the simulation 
results are shown in Figure 5. 
It can be obtained that when the two sides com- 
 
pete in the 60th round, the price of both sides is basi-
cally adjusted to the cost. 
Conclusion 
It is evidently shown in the model that when none 
of the two companies are able to meet all the demands 
in the market, the bigger the price gap, the more oscil-
lated it is in the process, thus, it doesn’t exist the pure 
strategic Nash equilibrium. However, when one of the 
two can offer the demands independently, Nash equi-
librium appears and is shown as the calculated results 
in Bertrand-Edgeworth model where the equilibrium 
reaches the cost price. 
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Fig. 5. Competitive Price Simulation of Company 1 and Company 2 
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АНАЛИЗ ИГРОВОЙ МОДЕЛИ НА ОСНОВЕ  
ДУОПОЛИИ БЕРТРАНА 
Хуан Сиань, Хун Цзя  
Северокитайский электротехнический университет, Пекин, КНР 
 
 
Исследование рынка дуополий имеет долгую историю. По причинам материального обес-
печения, права на патент на продукцию и концессии правительства, развитие многих отраслей 
экономики похоже на процесс дуополии. В теории игр модель Бертрана, которая рассматривает 
цену как стратегическую переменную, ближе к реальности  и дает больше отсылок к рынку, осо-
бенно к розничному рынку, рынку электроэнергии в развивающейся мировой конкуренции. 
Во-первых, в модели мы анализируем классическую модель Бертрана и равновесие Нэша. 
Во-вторых, применяется многоагентная технология, и проводится процедура торгов в 
дуополии Бертрана, в то же время, чтобы помочь агентам найти оптимальные решения, в каче-
стве основного алгоритма в исследовании выбран генетический алгоритм, основанный на много-
агентной модели Бертрана, и мы завершаем исследование применением программного обеспе-
чения алгоритма и анализом примеров. В результате аукцион по олигополии моделируется в 
MATLAB, что дает нам более точные и гибкие данные. 
В модели показано, что когда ни одна из двух компаний не может удовлетворить все требова-
ния на рынке, чем больше разрыв в ценах, тем сильнее колеблются они в процессе, таким образом, 
не существует чистого стратегического равновесия Нэша. Однако когда одна из двух компаний 
может предложить требования независимо, равновесие Нэша появляется и отображается как рас-
четные результаты в модели Бертрана-Эджворта, где равновесие достигает себестоимости. Кроме 
того, обсуждается также причина отсутствия стратегического равновесия Нэша. 
Ключевые слова: модель Бертрана, мультиагент, генетический алгоритм, равновесие Нэша. 
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